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Redefining the ‘affordability’ of social 
assistance programmes:  







The South African Child Support Grant (CSG) is an example of a social 
assistance programme that, despite chronic anxieties about affordability, 
expanded rapidly through parametric reforms, primarily of the age limit. The 
initial concern about affordability was rooted in a severe fiscal crisis facing the 
South African state in the mid-1990s. This resulted in widespread (but not total) 
political agreement that the initial programme should be modest. The 
subsequent improvement in public finances meant that affordability concerns 
became less binding, and affordability was redefined. Political pressures to 
address the enduring problem of poverty, and to be seen to do so, resulted in the 
steady expansion of the programme. Governments make choices about 
programmes such as the CSG, and these choices are ultimately political. But 
sometimes fiscal conditions frame the choices in ways that are very likely to 
result in political near-consensus against programmatic expansion. The 
‘affordability’ of social assistance programmes entails a mix of fiscal concerns 





One of the contentious issues in debates over the introduction or expansion of 
social protection programmes is their affordability. Many opponents of social 
protection programmes, including some who acknowledge that they can have 
poverty-reducing or developmental benefits, argue that they are simply 
unaffordable. Advocates of social protection programmes have sought to show 
that they are affordable. In Africa, where political elites have generally been 
ambivalent about cash transfer programmes (other than workfare), the World 
Bank. International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UNICEF have all published 
studies suggesting that cash transfer programmes are affordable even in low-
income countries (Kakwani & Subbarao, 2005, 2007; Pal et al., 2005; ILO, 
2008; Handley, 2009; Garcia & Moore, 2012; ILO, 2014; World Bank, 2015). 




countries could afford to honour their supposed commitments with respect to 
health, education, infrastructure, water and sanitation, agriculture and social 
protection. ‘Affordability’ entails the assessment of opportunity costs, in terms 
of both other areas of public expenditure and trade-offs over taxation. 
 
In the considerable literature on affordability, little attention has been paid to the 
political process through which fiscal and economic concerns are, or are not, 
taken into account. This paper examines the politics of ‘affordability’ with 
respect to the expansion of one social protection programme in South Africa, 
over just over a decade from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s. South Africa is an 
upper-middle income country with an extensive set of social assistance 
programmes (including old-age pensions, disability grants and child grants) 
dating back to the 1920s and 1930s. Since 1994 it has been governed by a party 
– the African National Congress (ANC) – that has strong rhetorical, ideological 
and political commitments to mitigating the very widespread poverty inherited 
from the apartheid era. Yet ANC governments were slow to expand social 
assistance, repeatedly raising concerns over affordability. In the face of 
considerable opposition, however, one programme in particular was expanded 
massively: The budget for the Child Support Grant was increased by more than 




Figure 1: Social assistance programme expenditure as share of GDP, 
1993-94 to 2013/14 
 
The democratically-elected ANC government inherited in 1994 both a level of 
poverty that was unusual in middle-income countries and a social assistance 
system that was unusually extensive. Social assistance programmes included 









































mothers with children. After 1994 reforms were largely ‘parametric’, i.e. they 
concerned the parameters of benefit levels, the means-test and other eligibility 
conditions of existing programmes. One of the inherited programmes – the ‘state 
maintenance grant’ (SMG) for single mothers – posed a challenge, in that it was 
in practice limited to single mothers from the country’s ‘white’, ‘coloured’ and 
‘Indian’ racial minorities and excluded the ‘African’ majority. A government-
appointed committee recommended that the existing SMG be replaced with a 
new ‘child support grant’ (CSG) for all low-income caregivers. Citing fiscal 
concerns, total expenditure on the proposed CSG would be no higher than under 
the old SMG. This could only be effected through reducing massively the value 
of the benefit paid and the age-limit up to which children were eligible (to the 
age of seven, compared with eighteen or sixteen for the SMG).1 Between 2003 
and 2012, however, and despite repeated anxiety about its affordability, the age-
limit for the CSG was raised in steps to eighteen years. Together with other 
minor parametric reforms, this resulted in a massive increase in coverage (to 
more than eleven million children)2 and public expenditure (from about 0.2 
percent to 1.2 percent of GDP, see Figure 1 and Appendix 1).  
 
South Africa’s CSG is one of a small number of social assistance programmes in 
the global South that cost more than 1 percent of GDP. Expenditures of about 1 
percent of GDP are approximately what international agencies (the World Bank, 
ILO, UNICEF) have advocated for many African countries. Understanding how 
and why a government concerned with affordability nonetheless increases 
expenditure on a programme by 1 percent thus has important possible 
implications for understanding the possibility of reform more broadly. Through 
a case-study of the politics of increasing expenditure on the CSG in South 
Africa, this paper enables us to examine the conditions in which fiscal 
constraints – even ones that are reiterated repeatedly – are later relaxed, such 
that ‘affordability’ is redefined.  
 
‘Affordability’ might be viewed as an objective and absolute binding constraint 
or as an entirely ideological or political choice or preference. In this paper I 
interpret affordability as combining elements of both. Fiscal conditions were 
undoubtedly important: The CSG was introduced at a moment of fiscal crisis, 
and a subsequent improvement in public finances meant that the South African 
state could increase steadily its real expenditure on child grants. But improved 
public finances cannot explain the rising share of government expenditure (or 
GDP) allocated to child grants, rather than to other areas of public expenditure. 
Nor can it explain why resources were spent on expanding coverage of poor 
                                                                 
1 The age limit for the child grant portion of the SMG had been reduced from 18 to 16 years 
under the 1992 Social Assistance Act (Lund, 2008: 62). 
2  Woolard & Leibbrandt (2010: 11, Figure 3) show how raising the age limit drove the 




families with children, rather than increasing the benefits paid to existing 
beneficiaries. ‘Affordability’ was mediated by politics. The intensified political 
(and ideological) imperative of poverty alleviation, mediated through the politics 
of the governing party (the ANC) and state, drove the redefinition of 
affordability, the prioritization of child grants specifically, and the emphasis on 
coverage rather than benefits. 
 
This paper considers six episodes of possible reform (shown in Table 1 at the 
end of the paper), falling into three major phases. The next section examines the 
fiscal constraints at the time of the introduction of the CSG in the late 1990s. 
The following section examines the decision, formally made in early 2003, to 
raise the age limit from seven to fourteen, and the rejection of more radical and 
expensive proposed reforms. The penultimate section examines the process 
leading to the decision, in 2009, to raise the age limit to eighteen. The final 
section reflects on the politics of affordability, and especially of redefining 
affordability in response to changing political as well as fiscal circumstances. 
This paper does not examine the consequences of the CSG in terms of either 
poverty-reduction or status-enhancement or fertility, except insofar as studies of 
the consequences informed policy reform (and in some cases were 
commissioned with this purpose).3  
  
 
Fiscal constraints and the introduction of the 
CSG 
 
The CSG was introduced during a severe fiscal crisis, and its initial parsimony 
reflected in part deep-rooted anxieties about affordability. The abolition of the 
SMG and introduction of the CSG have been documented by Lund (2008), the 
university professor who chaired the Committee on Child and Family Support 
that in 1996-97 recommended the reform. The problem facing the Lund 
Committee – and the Government – was what to do about the very iniquitous 
SMG that the democratically-elected ANC-led government inherited in 1994. 
 
The apartheid state bequeathed to its democratic successor a set of tax-financed, 
means-tested social assistance programmes for selected categories of deserving 
poor: the elderly, disabled, and single mothers. These programmes dated back to 
the early twentieth century, when they had been introduced to ensure that 
                                                                 
3 Studies of the effects on poverty include: Armstrong & Burger, 2009; Leibbrandt et al., 
2010; Devereux et al, 2011; Heinrich et al., 2012; and World Bank, 2014. Studies of the 
effects on dignity include Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2011, and Wright et al., 2015. Studies of the 





(deserving) ‘white’ (and ‘coloured’) citizens were kept out of deep poverty. 
Whereas the old-age pensions and disability grants had already been deracialised 
by 1994, the SMG remained de facto racialised: most recipients were ‘coloured’ 
or ‘Indian’, and almost none were ‘African’, although a massive majority of 
poor mothers and children in South Africa as a whole were ‘African’ (Lund, 
2008: 15-17).  
 
Deracialising the SMG posed a massive fiscal challenge. The existing SMG cost 
about R1 billion p.a. (about 0.2 percent of GDP, or US$250 million p.a.). “To 
award the grant at existing levels to all women and children who qualified 
would have cost some R12 billion per year”, reported Lund; “This was about 
equal to what was at that time already being spent on all the other pensions and 
grants, and about the same as the annual health budget” (ibid: 18). The cost of a 
deracialised but otherwise unreformed SMG would thus have been more than 2 
percent of GDP (and about 8 percent of national government expenditure). The 
option of abolishing the SMG altogether tempted ANC leaders, especially given 
that almost no African people – and hence almost no ANC voters – received the 
grant. In mid-1995, a majority of the inter-governmental ‘MINMEC’ committee 
of welfare ministers (i.e. national and provincial ministers) favoured abolition, 
primarily because of the calculated cost of retaining it. Lund herself happened to 
be attending this meeting, and suggested that “termination would be 
economically and socially disastrous for those receiving the SMG, and that there 
should be an investigation into the entire issue of child and family 
maintenance”. Her recommendation led to the appointment of the Committee on 
Child and Family Support (ibid: 18-19). 
 
The Lund Committee comprised a mix of academic and NGO experts who 
broadly concurred on the importance of public expenditure in providing a 
foundation for the alleviation of poverty. But, as the ANC deputy-minister of 
finance (and former trade unionist) Alec Erwin made clear to Lund (in a meeting 
in April 1996), any recommended reforms outside of the existing financial 
‘envelope’ (i.e. of expenditure on the SMG) “would not be entertained seriously 
by the political leadership”. The Committee “strategically decided” (in Lund’s 
words) to work within these fiscal constraints (ibid: 30). In its report, completed 
late in 1996 but only formally presented to (and accepted by) Cabinet in early 
1997, the Lund Committee recommended the phasing out of the generous SMG 
and introduction of a parsimonious and more age-restricted but nonetheless 
much more wide-reaching CSG. A low benefit and low age limit would keep 
expenditure within the existing financial envelope. The Committee was not 
unanimous on this: 
 
‘In the Committee, we were divided in perceptions as to the size of the 




addition to the R1.2 billion already going to the SMG. Some, 
moreover, felt that more resources should be diverted to the social 
services in general, rather than specifically to social assistance. Some 
were opposed to the proposed level of the CSG at introduction, and to 
the limited ages of eligible children, and felt that we should not 
behave so conservatively. … My personal view of accepting working 
within tight budget limits was an appreciation that the government 
was juggling with objectively important competitors for fiscal 
allocations which would impact on poverty, such as attempting to 
reduce backlogs in housing and introducing free primary healthcare’ 
(ibid: 90). 
 
When it came to setting the level of the proposed grant, ‘affordability’ depended 
in part on projections for economic growth: The stronger the economy grew, the 
more easily any given benefit could be ‘afforded’. Lund herself argued that “we 
should not build the design of a long-term entitlement on a present hope about 
future growth”. The Committee’s cautious recommendations were criticized 
strongly by civil society organisations, and was even denounced as ‘neo-liberal’. 
Lund defends her Committee’s work on the grounds that “even a progressive 
macro-economic policy would not have made the equalizing upwards of the 
SMG an affordable proposition” (ibid: 92-3). 
 
The low level of the proposed CSG contrasted starkly with the values of the 
SMG and other grants and pensions. The Lund Committee proposed that the 
CSG be set at R70/month. By comparison, the SMG paid a total of R537/month 
for one child (increased to R565 in mid-1996) or R664/month for two children 
(increased to R700).4 When the National Party government had phased in the 
elimination of racial discrimination in old-age pension and disability grants in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, it had reduced the real value of benefits paid to white 
South African citizens at the same time as raising (considerably) the value of 
benefits paid to its African subjects. This compromise value of the old-age 
pension and disability grant was R410/month (increased to R430 in mid-1996), 
i.e. more than five times higher than the proposed CSG. 
 
                                                                 
4 The SMG comprised two components: a child grant of R127 per child per month (increased 
to R135 in mid-1996) and a parent’s grant of R410 (increased to R430) (South African 
Statistics 2001: table 6.4; see also Lund, 2008: 15). Proudlock (2011: 150) reports that the 





Source: South African Reserve Bank.5 
 
Figure 2: Public finances, 1993-2015 
 
The primary reason for the fiscal conservatism of the Lund Committee and 
ANC-led government was anxiety over the deepening crisis in public finances 
(see Hirsch, 2005; Gelb, 2010). The combination of profligacy by the former 
National Party government and Bantustan administrations, continuing poor 
financial controls (especially at provincial level), generous post-apartheid wage 
settlements with public sector workers and the immense pressure to boost 
expenditure in many policy areas resulted in large budget deficits (at almost 7 
percent of GDP in 1994-95) and rising government debt and hence interest 
payments (see Figure 2). Amidst pressure on the exchange rate and rising 
interest rates, the ANC-led government’s economists worked on a 
macroeconomic stabilization plan. In June 1996 – just as the Lund Committee 
was getting into its stride – the new Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, 
announced the ‘GEAR’ (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) Macro-
Economic Strategy. The core of the strategy was a reduced budget deficit, 
accompanied by privatization, further trade liberalization and labour market 
policy reform. A little later the government introduced multi-year financial 
planning (through its Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, MTEF). Whilst 
much of the GEAR strategy was never implemented, the budget deficit and 
government debt were reduced (see Figure 2).  
 
The government’s successful efforts at reducing the budget deficit meant strong 
pressure on the spending departments to restrain expenditure, and to 
demonstrate that existing resources were being used efficiently. Treasury 
                                                                 
5 Online historical macro-economic time-series, variables KBP 4117, 4433 and 4434, 

















officials sat down with officials from the spending departments – especially 
Education and Health – to try to improve the efficiency of spending, so that 
existing resources were used to better, and generally more pro-poor, effect. The 
Department of Welfare intensified its efforts to reduce fraud in the social 
assistance system. Spending an additional 2 percent of GDP on the SMG 
programme would have reduced poverty dramatically in the short-term but 
blown the government’s entire fiscal and macro-economic strategy out of the 
water, as well as causing massive political division within the Cabinet as other 
government departments were required to exercise austerity. 
 
The fiscal crisis was not the only reason, however, for the Lund Committee’s 
caution. There were strong objections to grants on ideological grounds. In her 
retrospective account, Lund points to the conservatism of a few government 
officials and ANC MPs (Lund, 2008: 93, 103), but a conservative skepticism 
about ‘handouts’ and ‘dependency’ was widespread within the ANC elite 
generally (including Nelson Mandela; see Seekings & Nattrass, 2015: 154-9). 
This skepticism was shared by advocates of the developmental state, many of 
whom were in other respects very progressive. At the same time as the Lund 
Committee was conducting its investigation, the Department of Welfare was 
completing the White Paper on Social Development which made it clear that the 
government’s priorities were development and self-reliance. The Department’s 
flagship programme provided training for unemployed women with children 
with the goal of reducing their ‘dependence’ on grants.  
 
The ANC Minister of Welfare from April 1997 (until April 1999), Geraldine 
Fraser-Moleketsi, both emphasized the fiscal constraint and advocated a more 
developmental approach. She insisted that the Government was committed to 
providing a ‘safety net’ through pensions and grants, but stated (in 1997) that 
‘welfare expenditure’ had reached ‘its ceiling’. In future, budgetary allocations 
would increase slowly, if at all:  
 
‘The challenge facing us is to use the available resources optimally 
and bring about savings in the total welfare function through aligning 
expenditure with priorities, promoting greater efficiency and 
accountability in delivery and ensuring that programmes are well 
targeted at those in the greatest need and that the design of 
programmes is appropriate and cost-effective’.6  
 
The ‘social security system’, she said, should be ‘restructured’ so that it helped 
the poor ‘to produce their way out of poverty’.7 Fraser-Moleketsi praised her 
                                                                 
6 Hansard, 8th May 1997, col. 2314. 




department’s programme, which helped single mothers to establish small 
businesses – such as brick-making or growing and selling vegetables – and thus 
reduce their ‘dependence’ on social assistance. “We want to ensure that many of 
the beneficiaries move from dependency to self-sufficiency and towards 
building the self-esteem of women”.8  
 
The severity of the fiscal constraint was appreciated even by some passionate 
advocates of social assistance such as the ANC MP and chairperson of the 
parliamentary portfolio committee on Welfare, Cas Saloojee. “The budget for 
social security has very definite limits”, he told Parliament; there was “no 
bottomless well of funding” on which they could draw. Efforts should be 
targeted on the poorest.9 Civil society organisations, however, were less 
convinced, and demanded substantial increases in public spending. 
 
By the time the CSG was actually introduced, political factors had pushed the 
cost of the programme up above what had initially been considered affordable. 
The Lund Committee had recommended R70/month, and the Government 
initially opted for R75/month. Pressure from civil society organisations helped 
to stiffen the resolve of some ANC MPs, who rebelled against the executive and 
pushed for the value of the grant to be raised to R100 per month (Camay and 
Gordon, cited in Lund, 2008). First the ANC’s Policy Conference (in July 1997), 
then its National Executive Committee (NEC), then the Welfare MINMEC and 
finally the Cabinet itself accepted the R100/month proposal. Secondly, the age-
limit was confirmed as a child’s seventh birthday, rather than a lower cut-off 
(Lund, 2008: 97).10 Thirdly, the means test was less restrictive than critics 
feared. The Lund Committee itself had not paid much attention to the means 
test, but the Minister set it low enough to render an estimated 3 million children 
eligible – double the number anticipated by the Lund Committee. Fourthly, 
other conditions that were imposed at the outset were soon abandoned. The state 
initially required that caregivers participate in development programmes and 
show that their children had been immunized, but the necessary development 
programmes simply did not exist and the immunization requirement served to 
penalized children who were already especially disadvantaged. The 1997 
Welfare Laws Amendment Act stipulated that both the value of the CSG and the 
conditions (i.e. the age limit, means test and so on) be set through regulations 
published in the Government Gazette by the Minister of Welfare, with the 
concurrence of the Finance Minister. This meant that the restrictive conditions 
could be (and were) dropped easily (Madonsela, 2007: 8-9). For example, the 
                                                                 
8 Hansard, 9th Feb 1999: 305. See also 19th March 1999, col.2851-5. 
9 Hansard, 8th May 1997: col. 2325. 
10 The Lund Committee had proposed to pay the grant to children aged 0-9, with 0-6 as an 
alternative and 0-4 as the absolute minimum. The 0-6 option left unclear whether it meant 




means test was reformed in 1999, narrowing the income to be taken into account 
from the household as a whole to the caregiver and his or her spouse. These 
adjustments demonstrated that the budget constraint was a lot less precisely 
binding than the Lund Committee seemed to have assumed (Budlender, 
Proudlock & Jamieson, 2008: 15). 
 
Massive educational and publicity campaigns by civil society organisations and 
the Department of Welfare resulted in the number of registered beneficiaries 
rising to 2.6 million by April 2003. In real terms, expenditure on the CSG in 
2002/03 was more than double the SMG envelope, and the rollout was still far 
from complete, with an estimated 40 percent of eligible children still not 
registered. The state later attributed the incomplete rollout to the administrative 
incapacity of some of the provincial governments, the absence of birth 
certificates and identify documents, and enduring low levels of public awareness 
(Kganyago, 2007: 11-12). All of these problems had for years been most 
pronounced in heavily rural provinces, notably Limpopo (formerly Northern 
Province), the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.11  
 
One way in which the state could rein in expenditure was to allow the real value 
of the grant itself to fall in the face of inflation. The nominal value of the grant 
remained R100/month until mid-2001, by which time its real value had declined 
by 13 percent. An increase to R110/month only mitigated the real decline. By 
mid-2002 its real value had dropped still further. In addition, the means-test was 
not revised to take into account inflation, which meant that the income threshold 
at which families became ineligible declined in real terms, restricting eligibility. 
This became a focus of criticism in the early and mid-2000s, culminating in a 
legal challenge (Proudlock, 2011). Despite the falling real value of the grant and 
increasingly onerous means test, however, aggregate expenditure on the CSG 
had risen above the envelope of prior SMG expenditure in real terms, although 
expenditure remained tiny compared with the cost that would have been 
incurred had the SMG been deracialised without reform. Both the value of the 
grant and the number of beneficiaries were higher than the Lund Committee had 
originally proposed, reflecting the political pressures for the constraints of 
affordability to be relaxed. 
 
In this first phase of reform the ANC and government felt the need to remove 
the remnants of racial discrimination from social assistance programmes. The 
SMG could not continue in the form inherited in 1994 (and access by African 
men and women to disability grants needed to be improved). But the ANC and 
government were under little immediate pressure to raise expenditures on social 
assistance programmes. The ANC enjoyed an overwhelming majority in 
                                                                 




Parliament and was not worried about re-election. It would have been able to 
end the SMC and put nothing in its place on the grounds that the SMG was an 
expensive vestige of the privileges of the racial minorities – just as the ANC 
Government withdrew public funds from residential homes for the aged and 
other programmes that did not reach the African majority. Some civil society 
organisations and MPs lobbied for more generosity to the deserving poor, but 
the ANC leadership (including the Minister of Welfare from 1997 to 1999) was 
united in its wariness of ‘handouts’ and preference for a ‘developmental’ route 
to poverty-reduction, and needed only to placate critics with minor concessions. 
The fiscal crisis meant that a bold and expensive CSG was unaffordable in a 




The 2003 decision to expand the CSG to age 14 
 
In February 2003, President Mbeki announced in his ‘State of the Nation’ 
address (opening Parliament) that the age-limit on the CSG would be raised 
from seven to fourteen years. The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Social 
Development (formerly Welfare) soon clarified that this reform would be phased 
in over three years: children aged seven and eight would become eligible in 
April 2003, children aged nine and ten from April 2004, and children up to the 
age of fourteen from April 2005. The Minister of Social Development explained 
that administrative constraints required a phase-in period. 
 
The context was one of improved public finances. After a period of sluggish 
economic growth in the late 1990s, economic growth picked up from 2000, 
largely because of improved global conditions. Economic growth combined with 
fiscal consolidation to lessen anxiety about the cost of servicing the public debt 
(which in the late 1990s had accounted for one quarter of the state’s total 
revenue). By 2001, the Treasury could claim that the ‘overhaul’ of spending 
programmes together with ‘buoyant growth’ in tax revenues had succeeded in 
lowering both the budget deficit and the public debt as shares of GDP (see 
Figure 2). Five years of sound fiscal management had provided the basis for 
increases in public expenditure. Declining debt service costs freed up resources 
for other programmes (Republic of South Africa, 2001a). In 2002, the Treasury 
had reported that: 
 
‘As a result of sound economic management, the public finances are 
healthy and will contribute towards increased social and economic 
development. This year, we build on the growth-oriented fiscal stance 




spending, especially on programmes that deliver basic services to the 
poorest sections of our society’ (Republic of South Africa, 2002a: iii). 
 
A substantial increase in the CSG (from R110 to R140/month) meant that, for 
the first time, its real value was substantially higher than it had been at the time 
of its introduction in 1998 (see Appendix 1). 
 
Expenditure on welfare was slow to rise in response to improving public 
finances. Total expenditure on welfare had declined marginally in real terms in 
1998/99 and 1999/2000, before increasing marginally in 2000/01. Over these 
three years grant payments had actually declined, whilst personnel expenditures 
had grown (Republic of South Africa, 2001b: 61-2). In 2001, the Treasury 
forecast that expenditure would grow over the three-year MTEF period – i.e. 
2001/02-2003/04 – by a modest average annual 1.6 percent in real terms, 
primarily because of increased take-up of the CSG. Even then, the Treasury 
warned that the forecast “doubling of grant beneficiaries between 1998 and 2003 
will put pressure on social development budgets” (ibid: 63). In 2002/03, 
expenditure (on disability grants as well as the CSG) did in fact rise more 
sharply than forecast previously. Under other circumstances, this might have led 
the state to rein in expenditure. Given improved public finance, and political 
pressures, the state instead expanded the CSG.  
 
The raised age limit for the CSG meant that expenditure would rise very 
substantially. In addition to the estimated 3.2 million children who would 
become eligible for the CSG when the age limit was raised to fourteen, at least 
another 1 million children below the age of seven were already entitled to grants 
but not yet registered (Republic of South Africa, 2003c: 103). In 2003, the 
Treasury forecast that actual expenditure on all social grants by 2005/06 would 
be 55 percent higher in real terms than actual expenditure in 2001/02. When, in 
2004, the Treasury for the first time published data for expenditure on the CSG 
specifically, it showed that in 2000/01, only R1.4 billion had been spent. By 
2003/04, expenditure on the CSG was estimated to have reached almost R8 
billion, and forecast expenditure would rise to R17 billion in 2006/07 (all in 
current prices) (Republic of South Africa, 2004: 77). The expansion of the CSG 
to older children could not be financed out of the regular provincial budgetary 
allocations and was therefore funded instead through a substantial ‘conditional 
grant’ to the provinces: R1.1 billion was budgeted in 2003/04, R3.4 billion for 
2004/05 and R6.4 billion for 2005/06 (Republic of South Africa, 2003c: 97). 
 
Whilst the expansion of the CSG was a conscious choice by the government, 
public expenditure on social grants rose also as a result of unanticipated trends. 
Reforms to the disability grant assessment system (see Kelly, 2014) resulted in 




Treasury in 2004 to revise upwards its forecast future expenditures. As a share 
of GDP, actual expenditure on social grants was put at 2 percent of GDP in 
2000/01 and 2001/02, and was forecast to rise to 3.4 percent by 2006/07. This 
unplanned growth prompted a resurgence of the discourse of affordability that 
had characterized the late 1990s:  
 
‘Growth of this magnitude relative to GDP raises sustainability 
questions for the future. A better balance needs to be struck between 
fighting poverty through cash transfers, and ensuring broad-based 
development and the creation of opportunities for the poor to 
participate productively in the South African economy’ (Republic of 
South Africa, 2004: 73).  
 
This warning was repeated, almost verbatim, the following year, although the 
Treasury also noted that expenditure was projected to moderate now that both 
the disability grant and CSG had achieved full coverage (Republic of South 
Africa, 2005: 50, 56). 
 
 
Note: Data are not available in the 2002 IGFR. 
 
Figure 3: Revisions to actual and forecast expenditure on cash transfers, 
1998/99-2007/08  
 
Figure 3 shows the actual and forecast expenditure on cash transfers (including 
some minor expenses in addition to social grants), taken from the MTEF 
estimates published between 1999 and 2005 (excepting 2002, when the 
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(IGFRs). Each series plots a few years of actual expenditure (in the past), 
followed by a few years of forecast expenditure (in the future); the number of 
years varies between series. The data are all in current prices, and show that 
actual and forecast expenditure were rising (in current prices). The data on 
actual expenditures – i.e. the first part of each series – generally match the 
previous year’s forecasts, but the forecast data almost all rise over time. For 
example, the forecast in 2003 for expenditure in 2004/05 would be higher than 
the previous year’s forecast (i.e. in 2002) for 2004/05. Whilst the forecasts in 
1999 and 2000 were not revised substantially, later forecasts were revised 
upward. This could have been because inflation surged much faster than 
expected. This was the case in 2002/03, when actual inflation exceeded 
considerably previously forecast inflation, explaining part of the upward shift 
shown in Figure 3 between the 2001 and 2003 IGFRs. Over the following two 
years actual inflation exceeded previously forecast inflation, but by less than 1 
percentage point. The primary cause of the upward revision in forecast 
expenditure over time was because the forecast growth in real expenditure was 
repeatedly being revised upwards.  
 
In sum, improved public finances in the early 2000s generated more fiscal space 
for reforms that would increase very substantially public expenditure, although 
unanticipated increases in expenditure continued to panic the Treasury. The 
expanded space resulted in policy reforms because, however, of political 
conditions, within the government, within the ANC and the ANC-led ‘Alliance’, 
in civil society and in the electorate. 
 
In June 1999, following South Africa’s second democratic elections, a new 
Minister of Welfare (now renamed Social Development) was appointed. Zola 
Skweyiya was to serve as Minister for ten years, presiding over the expansion of 
the CSG. Skweyiya himself had spent his entire adult life in exile as an ANC 
member, law student and then ANC official, until his return to South Africa in 
1990. In the 1994-99 government he had served as Minister of Public Service 
and Administration. Skweyiya injected a new concern with poverty, especially 
in rural areas, into public discourse over social grants. In his first year, Skweyiya 
travelled extensively through rural areas where he witnessed firsthand the scale 
and consequences of poverty and the importance of pensions and grants in 
mitigating it. Whereas his predecessor seemed to have bought into the 
developmental critique of grants as handouts, Skweyiya embraced them as a 
primary mechanism for addressing poverty. In his first departmental budget 
debate in Parliament, in early 2000, he quoted President Mbeki’s call to create a 
“humane and people-centred society” and went on to argue that the challenge 




forms of poverty, can begin to see evidence of real change in their daily lives”.12 
Skweyiya’s reformism was soundly endorsed by the chair of the Portfolio 
Committee, Saloojee, who repeatedly called for a faster rollout of the CSG: 
 
‘The initial strategy for targeting our country’s poorest children is to 
be followed by broader coverage, to ultimately include all the 
country’s poor. In the light of the slow pace of delivery, it seems clear 
that comprehensive coverage will be somewhat delayed. If these 
children go hungry and have parents with no visible means of support, 
we have failed these children by not providing them with support to 
ensure their protection and development’.13  
 
What was needed, Skweyiya and Saloojee agreed, was “comprehensive social 
security”. In mid-1999, a two-year-long review of the social security system by 
a five-person ‘inter-departmental task team’, convened by the Department of 
Social Development, had concluded that the major gaps were the absence of 
child benefits for children from the age of seven and the absence of any income 
support for unemployed adults. Amidst press reports that suggested that both 
Skweyiya and his Director-General (Lucy Abrahams) favoured a bold expansion 
of coverage to unemployed adults,14 the Government appointed a Committee of 
Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security System. This Committee, chaired 
by Skweyiya’s special advisor Viviene Taylor, was asked to propose both a 
long-term vision and immediate reforms, bearing in mind affordability. In its 
Report, two years later, the Committee noted a series of problems with the CSG, 
including the low value of the benefit, problems with the means-test and other 
administrative difficulties, and the age limit, which the Committee described as 
being without ‘real rational basis’ and inconsistent with the definition of a child 
in the constitution (Republic of South Africa, 2002: 59). The Committee 
recommended, inter alia, the immediate extension of the CSG to all children to 
the age of 18. This would take the total cost of the programme (together with 
other grants for foster children and disabled children) to R26 billion or 2 percent 
of GDP. This proposal was rather overshadowed, however, by the Committee’s 
tentative recommendation of a Basic Income Grant (BIG), which would cover 
all South Africans who did not receive any other grant, which really meant 
income support for unemployed adults. This would take the total cost of all 
social assistance programmes to about 6 percent of GDP, on top of substantial 
increases in contributory programmes (ibid: 147). The Treasury warned the 
Committee off any discussion of taxation, on the grounds that this was the 
Treasury’s responsibility. Committee member Pieter Le Roux subsequently 
                                                                 
12 Hansard, 18th April 2000, col. 2662. 
13 Ibid, col. 2677. 




argued that the combined expanded CSG and new BIG for adults could be 
funded through a 50 percent increase in sales taxes (Le Roux, 2002).15 
 
Skweyiya’s and Saloojee’s public statements encouraged a bold vision of 
reform. In his 2002 departmental budget vote he described social assistance as 
“the Government’s primary investment in poverty alleviation”, and affirmed that 
the Government would continue to increase spending on social assistance as 
resource constraints allow.16 Saloojee seemed to endorse repeatedly the 
proposed Basic Income Grant.17 Other ANC MPs, however, continued to 
emphasise that “transfers alone cannot address the pervasive challenge of 
poverty reduction”, and seemed to favour spending on job creation.18 Most 
importantly, neither the ANC leadership nor the Cabinet accepted the Taylor 
Committee’s recommendations on either the CSG or a BIG. The Minister of 
Finance, Trevor Manuel, questioned their affordability and administrative 
feasibility, and denounced the call for a BIG as ‘populist’.19 After discussion at 
the Cabinet lekgotla (or extended meeting) in July 2002, government spokesman 
Joel Netshitenzhe reported that the government was moving towards a rather 
different ‘philosophy’: Able-bodied adults should not receive ‘handouts’, but 
should be helped to “enjoy the opportunity, the dignity and the rewards of 
work”.20 President Mbeki, in President Mbeki in his ‘State of the Nation’ 
address in February 2003 warned that “the government must act to ensure that 
we reduce the number of people dependent on social welfare, increasing the 
numbers that rely for their livelihood on normal participation in the economy”.   
 
Whilst the BIG lacked a clear, strong champion within either the government 
(Coleman, 2003: 121) or the ANC leadership, and also lacked strong support 
from any powerful interest group (Matisonn & Seekings, 2003; Seekings & 
Matisonn, 2012), the ANC was facing growing pressure to do something quickly 
about poverty. Skweyiya himself never publicly committed himself to a BIG, 
but invested considerable effort in accessing resources for other programmes 
reaching specific categories of ‘deserving’ poor. Children were the obvious 
group. Even the Treasury’s favoured economists argued that expanding the CSG 
was preferable to introducing a BIG (Van der Berg & Bredenkamp, 2002). The 
expansion of the CSG was also backed by a more effective NGO grouping than 
the one behind the BIG. NGOs such as the Black Sash together with university-
                                                                 
15 To be precise, Le Roux costed the BIG. But he included all children not currently receiving 
the CSG as BIG recipients rather than separating them out and then calculating how to 
finance separately the expanded CSG and new grants for adults. 
16 Hansard, 3rd April 2001, col. 1956-7. 
17 Hansard, 3rd April 2001, col.1972; 19th March 2002, col.1622-3. 
18 e.g. M.Masutha, in Hansard, 19th March 2002, col.1634-8. 
19 Business Day, 22nd February 2002. 




based activists and researchers such as the Children’s Institute at the University 
of Cape Town had for some time been calling for an age-limit of 18, as well as 
substantially increased benefits and reformed conditions and assessment 
mechanisms. In 2001, they and other NGOs established the Alliance for 
Children’s Access to Social Security (ACESS), which lobbied primarily around 
the age-limit. The NGOs conducted research on the benefits of broader 
coverage, made good use of the media, and repeatedly made submissions to the 
parliamentary Portfolio Committee (Proudlock, 2011). NGOs invoked 
frequently the Constitution, which specified 18 years as the upper age-limit of a 
legal ‘child’, included income security (including through social assistance) 
among the listed socio-economic rights, and attached special emphasis to the 
rights of children. (At this stage, however, civil society sought to deploy its 
powers of persuasion and criticism rather than resort to litigation). 
 
Amidst continuing bad news about the trend in poverty (Republic of South 
Africa, 2003b: 17) and ‘jobless’ economic growth, and facing another election 
in 2004, the ANC and government were open to persuasion to raise the age limit 
for the CSG to 14 years rather than concede the much more grandiose demands 
for an age-limit of 18 or a BIG for the over-18s. The major opposition parties 
had all lined up to record their support for an expanded CSG. Affordability was 
a very plausible objection to the BIG package, costing 4 percent of GDP (or 
more, in the Treasury’s calculations) but, with improved public finances, the 
Treasury was unable to argue convincingly that the country could not afford the 
0.5 percent of GDP that it would cost to raise the age-limit on the CSG. In the 
very same speech in which he raised concerns over ‘dependency’ on public 
welfare, the President announced that the age limit would be raised to 14 years. 
 
 
The decisions in 2008-09 to expand the CSG to 
ages 15 and then 18 
 
The 2003 decision led to the CSG age-limit being raised in three phases. In the 
final phase, effective from 1 April 2005, children aged 11, 12 or 13 years 
became eligible for the CSG (subject to the means test and other conditions). As 
April 2006 approached, calls proliferated for the age limit to be raised further. 
NGOs continued to press hard for the age-limit to be raised to 18, and resorted 
to litigation as part of the campaign. The Department of Social Development 
was sympathetic, but the Treasury argued that a major expansion of expenditure 
was not affordable, and Social Development backed away from conflict. In 
February 2008, the Finance Minister announced a one-year increase in the age 
limit, from the 14th to the 15th birthday, with effect from January 2009. Over the 




one hand, a series of statements apparently indicated a commitment to raising 
the age-limit to 18. A second series of statements, however, suggested that this 
remained under consideration. Eventually, in late 2009, the Government firmly 
committed itself to raising the age limit, to a child’s 16th birthday (with effect 
from January 2010). Children receiving grants would then continue to receive 
them until their 18th birthdays, so that the age-limit became 18 for all by the end 
of 2012. Whereas the decisions in 2002/03 to raise the limit to 14 had been made 
cleanly, the process in 2008/09 was untidy, as the Cabinet swung to and fro 
between raising the age limit to 18 and pursuing alternative, employment-centric 
interventions (such as a youth wage subsidy) for older adolescents. As in the 
early 2000s, the decision to raise the age-limit was framed by other policy 
options. In the earlier period, hostility to a BIG opened space for raising the 
CSG age limit as a compromise. In the later period, the obstacles attached to a 
youth wage subsidy seem to have weakened opposition to raising further the age 
limit. The decision marked the nadir of the developmental approach to welfare 
that had been trumpeted with great fanfare a decade earlier. 
 
It is not easy to reconstruct the preferences in the 2000s of different parts of the 
state, but the affidavits submitted in court cases over the CSG provide some 
indication. The Director-General of the Department of Social Development 
(DoSD), Vusi Madonsela,21 declared in an affidavit in early 2007 that ‘at no 
time’ had it been ‘the intention of the DoSD or the Cabinet to halt the extension 
of the child support grant’ at the age of 14. Madonsela reports that, at the 
beginning of 2006, having completed the extension of the CSG to children up to 
the age of 14, the DoSD “proposed to Cabinet that the child support grant be 
further extended to children under the age of 18 years”. Choosing his words 
carefully, Madonsela stated that, “after careful consideration of the current 
extension and of the resources available”, it was decided (presumably by the 
Cabinet) that the priority was to “consolidate the current child support grant 
extension by drawing as many currently eligible as possible into the social 
assistance net”. Most of the eligible but non-benefitting children were, 
Madonsela pointed out, in very poor, rural areas, so increasing coverage with the 
existing age limit was a pro-poor option (Madonsela, 2007: 13).  
 
Taking Madonsela’s account at face value, there were clear disagreements 
within the state, with the DoSD pushing for a raised age limit, against resistance 
from the Treasury and perhaps other government departments also. The 
Treasury view was set out by its Director-General, Lesetja Kganyago, in another 
affidavit sworn in early 2007 (‘supplementing’ Madonsela’s). Kganyago 
reported that the expansion of CSG in early 2000s pushed up against ‘budget 
constraints’: A ‘balanced approach’, he said, meant finding the right balance 
                                                                 




between provision for the elderly, disabled and children (Kganyago, 2007: 13). 
The government was committed to the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights, but there were trade-offs between different programmes: The rapid 
growth of social assistance expenditures meant that the budget for other poverty-
alleviating programmes had been squeezed, Kganyago argued. Kganyago also 
pointed to the importance of growth- and employment-enhancing programmes 
(including infrastructural investments). Whilst grants had mitigated poverty, the 
poor experienced declining earnings from employment or remittances. It would 
be ‘prudent’ for the government to balance its recurrent welfare expenditures 
and its growth-enhancing investments. If employment grew, there would be less 
need for social grants. Raising the age limit to eighteen years would cost more 
than R5b per annum. “The issue”, Kganyago concluded, was “not simply one of 
affordability but one of balancing competing demands on public expenditure, 
determining priorities and rigorous evaluation of policy choices” (ibid: 25-6).  
 
This and other reservations raised in Cabinet were identified as issues requiring 
attention before the age limit could be raised any further. Madonsela records that 
Cabinet identified five issues. First, administrative “inefficiencies and 
inadequacies” in the delivery of grants had to be addressed. Secondly, “the 
continued sustainability of the social assistance system” had to be investigated. 
Thirdly, there needed to be an investigation also of “whether the social 
assistance system creates dependency”, especially given the huge number of 
beneficiaries. Another topic for investigation was whether social grants created 
perverse incentives, such as (in the case of the CSG) encouraging teenage 
pregnancy. Finally, attention should be paid to “ways in which social grants can 
be linked to reduction of poverty and increase in employment”, i.e. how they 
might be developmental. According to Madonsela, the Cabinet expected these 
various investigations to be concluded by March 2007.  
 
This was all summarised in the concept of ‘consolidation’, as Madonsela put it. 
“The decision to temporarily halt the child support grant below age 14 in 2006” 
reflected, “in part”, the Cabinet’s decision to allocate resources to consolidation 
not only of the existing CSG but also other areas of public expenditure including 
health care, education and housing, food security and public works programmes, 
and so on (Madonsela, 2007: 16). Madonsela later reiterated this point: The age 
limit was set on the basis of “budgetary constraints in light of the view taken by 
Government that, in order to maximize the impact of the child support grant, 
such grant must be coupled with the consolidation of services ranging from 
health to housing to education” (ibid: 26). 
 
The DoSD did not retreat entirely. It proposed to the Cabinet lekgotla in January 
2007 that it investigate poverty among children older than 13, and identify 




Cabinet approved this, and task teams were established, with the objective of 
reporting back to Cabinet for its July lekgotla (ibid: 26-7). 
 
As in the early 2000s, the state as a whole was under pressure from NGOs. In 
the mid-2000s the Children’s Institute (a key member of ACESS) had produced 
a series of studies on the rollout of the CSG to children in the 7-14 age group. 
The research documented many irregularities in the registration process, and 
drew attention to major flaws in the means test. NGOs also intensified their 
lobbying for an increase in the age limit to eighteen, in line with the definition of 
a child in the Constitution. Exasperated with the lack of response from the state, 
NGOs shifted from a strategy of persuasion (and criticism) to litigation. The first 
major case was that of Florence Mahlangu, a casually-employed domestic 
worker in North-West Province whose second child received the CSG until his 
7th birthday but thereafter was repeatedly denied the CSG on the grounds that he 
was too old. The case was initiated in mid-2005, in the face of the state’s 
inadequate response to a series of reports from NGOs on flaws in the CSG 
system. In November 2006, after some of these flaws had been addressed, 
papers were refiled in court, focusing specifically on the age-limit of fourteen. 
The state filed its response in mid-2007. The case was heard in the High Court 
in March 2008. A second case (Ncamile), initiated in early 2008, focused on the 
means test (Proudlock, 2011). 
 
In these cases (as in other cases concerning the old-age pension) the DoSD and 
Treasury tried to defend the existing procedures for allocating budgets between 
different programmes. This was harder in Ncamile, given that they had allowed 
the real value of the means-test threshold to fall over time. The DoSD, with the 
eventual and reluctant concurrence of the Treasury, gazetted major reforms to 
the means test in August 2008, resulting in an additional 1 million children 
under the age of 14 becoming eligible for the CSG (Proudlock, 2011: 159). The 
state continued to resist staunchly in court demands that it raise the age limit on 
the CSG. 
 
The extension of the CSG to children aged 16 and 17 was more controversial 
than to younger children, because older teenagers could leave school, have 
children or work. Providing cash grants for out-of-school adolescents, and 
especially teenage mothers, riled many in the ANC and state. The 
‘developmental’ alternative was to provide vocational training and employment 
opportunities, perhaps through a youth wage subsidy programme (which began 
to be mooted in about 2008). The research programme agreed by the Cabinet 
was a response to such anxieties – and the importance of the research lay in 





The first reports were completed in late 2006 and presented to Cabinet 
(Madonsela, 2007: 12-15). A rather rushed preliminary report (contracted out to 
external consultants) on ‘perverse incentives’ concluded that the CSG had no 
effect on teenagers’ decisions over having children and that there was similarly 
little evidence that other grants incentivized undesirable behaviour (Kesho 
Consulting, 2006). The DoSD itself produced a rather vacuous report on the 
conceptual links between grants, poverty alleviation and development (DoSD, 
2006).22 The DoSD had commissioned three further studies: a panel study of the 
impact of the existing CSG, a review of the likely impact of raising the age 
limit, and a poll of beneficiaries (Madonsela, 2007: 18). It is not entirely clear 
when these studies were completed. The review was contracted to the Children’s 
Institute. The Economic Policy Research Institute was commissioned to examine 
the means-test and the Community Agency for Social Enquiry was 
commissioned to examine conditionalities (Budlender, 2008), but it is not clear 
who was commissioned to undertake either the panel study or the poll of 
beneficiaries. Nor is it clear whether there were any studies of either dependency 
or financial sustainability, as (according to Madonsela) requested by the 
Cabinet. 
 
It is not clear how the research was received in Cabinet, but the Cabinet clearly 
remained divided. At its National Conference in December 2007 the ANC 
resolved that the CSG age limit be “gradually extended to eighteen years”, but 
the ANC resolved also that “grants must not create dependency and thus must be 
linked to economic activity”.23 At the beginning of 2008, President Mbeki – who 
had been defeated by his rival Jacob Zuma in the contest for the presidency of 
the party at the December conference – pointedly did not mention the CSG at all 
in his ‘State of the Nation Address’ (on 8th February), despite mentioning that 
the age of eligibility of elderly men for the old-age pension was to be reduced 
(in line with another conference resolution). Mbeki merely reported that the 
Government was investigating interventions for “vulnerable children over the 
age of 14”.24 Days later, however, Skweyiya told the parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee (on 12th February)25 and then announced in a press briefing (on 14th 
February) that the age limit would be increased to 18 years. This was almost 
immediately contradicted by the Minister of Finance, who announced in his 
budget speech (on 20th February) that the age-limit would be raised only to 15 
years (with effect from January 2009). 
 
                                                                 
22 In addition, a three-volume profile of grant beneficiaries was published (de Koker et al., 
2006), but this was based on research conducted in 2005 and predated the discussion and 
resolution in Cabinet. 
23 http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2536.  
24 http://www.gov.za/node/537711.  




A year later the Cabinet had inched towards agreement on raising the age limit, 
but no clear decision had been made. In September 2008, the dominant Zuma 
faction within the ANC ousted Mbeki as President. Legally unable to assume the 
presidency himself (because he was not an MP), Zuma put Kgalema Motlanthe 
in the post. In November 2008 the ANC finalized its ‘policy framework’ for its 
2009 election manifesto, committing the ANC to raising the age limit to 18 
years, subject to conditions including school attendance.26 It was Motlanthe who 
delivered the 2009 ‘State of the Nation Address’ to Parliament. In his address, 
Motlanthe cited research (by Stellenbosch economist Servaas Van der Berg) that 
pointed to declining income poverty and child hunger – a very welcome finding 
for the Government – and credited much of this to the CSG. Motlanthe stated 
that the Government would extend progressively the CSG to children to the age 
of 18 years. In his Budget Speech a few weeks later, the Minister of Finance 
(Manuel) reported that, in light of the “compelling evidence” in “recent 
research” that the CSG had reduced child poverty, “consideration is being given, 
subject to affordability, to the extension of the child support grant to the age of 
18”. The Treasury’s Budget Review added that “evidence on the impact of grants 
on older children is still awaited, and research has been undertaken on options 
for linking grants to key aspects of child care, such as schooling and health 
monitoring” (Republic of South Africa, 2009: 91). 
 
The decisive research seems to have been not the research commissioned by the 
Cabinet on the CSG specifically, but rather Van der Berg’s research on poverty 
trends. Having long suffered in the face of research that showed that poverty 
worsened in the 1990s, the Government seized with alacrity Van der Berg’s 
(controversial) findings. The fact that the decline in poverty seemed due more to 
the expansion of social grants than to rising employment did not mean that job 
creation was any less important, but did seem to render ANC and state leaders 
more sympathetic to social grants. 
 
The cost of extending the CSG age-limit was certainly not prohibitive. 
Madonsela reported in 2007 that 2.2 million children aged 14-17 would be 
eligible if the CSG was extended, under existing conditions. This would cost, he 
reported, an estimated R5.7 billion p.a. (Madonsela, 2007: 30). In a responding 
affidavit in the same court case (Mahlangu), Budlender (2007) estimated the 
number of eligible children to be rather higher, at 2.5 million, although 
experience suggested that coverage would never reach all eligible children. She 
calculated the cost (allowing for less than 100 percent take-up) at an initial R3 
billion in the first year rising to R6 billion p.a. thereafter. This, Budlender noted, 
amounted to less than 10 percent of the existing social assistance budget. The 
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revisions to the means test effected in August 2008 would have raised the cost of 
raising the CSG age limit.  
 
In neither 2006 nor 2007 nor 2008 did the Treasury budget for this additional 
expenditure in its MTEF. But, as Budlender pointed out, there were examples of 
the MTEF estimates for future years being adjusted in response to exigencies 
such as the costs of transport infrastructure for the 2010 football World Cup or 
the Gautrain urban transport system (Budlender, 2007). The formal 
announcement that the CSG age limit would be raised was eventually made in 
October 2009, to coincide with the release of new MTEF figures that provided 
for additional expenditure. The 2009 MTEF budgeted for an additional R4 
billion of expenditure on cash transfers in 2010/11, i.e. on top of the forecast for 
that year from the 2008 MTEF. Not all of this was due to the CSG age-limit. 
The Treasury later reported that the additional expense of raising the CSG age 
limit was covered by supplementary budgetary allocations of R1,3 billion, R3,1 
billion and R5 billion in 2010/11, 2011/12 and 2012/13 respectively (Republic 
of South Africa, 2010: 194). Figure 4 shows that successive MTEFs in 2007, 
2008 and 2009 raised forecast expenditure on cash transfers. The MTEFs from 
2010 onwards did forecast rising expenditure, but the forecasts were not revised 




Figure 4: Revisions to forecast expenditure on cash transfers, 2007/08-
2014/15 
 
The 2009 MTEF also forecast much faster growth in public expenditure than 
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total real increase in expenditure on the CSG alone between 2008/09 (prior to 
the age limit being raised) and 2011/12, with forecast real expenditure on all 
cash transfers rising by 22 percent. Whilst not all of this increase was due to the 
CSG age-limit, the importance of the age-limit reform is evident in the fact that 
real expenditure was forecast to level off after 2011/12. 
 
The final phase of discussion of the CSG age limit occurred against the 
backdrop of the global financial and economic crisis. In early 2009 the Treasury 
reported that economic growth was expected “to slow sharply” in 2009, but the 
preceding years of strong economic growth and healthy public finances meant 
that the Government could respond boldly. “Sustained growth in public 
expenditure” would serve to “cushion the economy and reinforce the social 
safety net for the poor” (Republic of South Africa, 2010: 1). 
 
‘Slowing economic growth has put pressure on government revenues 
and reduced the fiscal space for increased expenditure. However, as a 
result of government’s record of sound fiscal management and 
prudent policy choices over the past decade, the state will be able to 
increase spending on social services and fixed investment over the 
medium term. The new and difficult circumstances call for both bold 
action and careful policy adjustments to ensure that the economy 
continues to grow and to improve the living standards of all South 
Africans. Boldness is required because of the severity of the situation, 
yet care must be taken so that ill-conceived or poorly executed 
interventions do not burden future generations’ (ibid: 2). 
 
The budget deficit was forecast to grow to almost 4 percent of GDP in 2009/10. 
At this time (February 2009), the Treasury still envisaged that the poor would be 
protected in the short-term through the expansion of labour-intensive public 
employment programmes rather than of social grants. The Treasury also 
remained committed to a developmental vision, emphasizing public investment 
in infrastructure (as well as selective market deregulation). The Treasury 
remained committed to an economic strategy that involved education, training 
and job creation, especially for young people, including through a wage subsidy 
scheme (see ibid: 7-8). But job creation was focused on young men and women 
from the age of eighteen. Up to that age, adolescents were expected to remain in 
the educational system (as almost all were). Indeed, the extension of the CSG to 
the age of 18 was initially made conditional on children attending school (ibid: 
104). 
 
One explanation of the 2008/09 episode is that, as Proudlock puts it, “power 
shifted to the left” within the ANC at its National Conference in Polokwane in 




Zuma ousted the incumbent leadership headed by Mbeki. Zuma’s coalition 
encompassed most of the more ‘radical’ factions within the ANC and ANC-led 
Alliance, including the trade unions, the populist ANC Youth League and the 
South African Communist Party (Booysen, 2011). With respect to the CSG, the 
2007 conference did resolve that the age limit should be raised (‘gradually’) to 
18, but it took another two years for the Cabinet to agree to increase the age 
limit beyond 15. Moreover, as even NGOs acknowledged, budget constraints 
did not vanish.27 The 2007 conference did not result in new appointments to key 
ministries: Manuel continued as Minister of Finance, and Skweyiya as Minister 
of Social Development until the elections in mid-2009 (and their successors 
were no more radical than them). 
 
The 2009 election was a more important influence. The ANC had won many 
fewer votes in the 1999 and 2004 elections than in 1994, and in 2009 faced a 
resurgent opposition comprising both the Democratic Alliance (supported 
largely by racial minorities) and a party (the Congress of the People) led by 
former ANC leaders who had defected from the ANC after the 2007 conference. 
The ANC’s strategy in 2009 entailed projecting the dual images of a track-
record of achievement hitherto and regeneration under new leadership, with the 
future promise of renewed achievement in future (Beresford, 2015; Booysen, 
2011). In addition, the ANC and government faced a proliferation of protests, 
focused on municipal services and representation, but widely interpreted as a 
“rebellion of the poor” (Alexander, 2010).  
 
The ANC included the commitment to raising the age-limit in its 2009 election 
manifesto, prior to the Polokwane conference, and the increase to the age of 15 
was already being implemented in 2009 – which meant that existing 
beneficiaries of the CSG would not have lost the grant if their children turned 15 
in the immediate run-up to the election. Most of the other political parties had 
already supported raising the age-limit, and the ANC would not have wanted to 
defend a more conservative position against its rivals’ criticisms, especially if 
grants were being discontinued to long-standing beneficiaries. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the age limit had been raised to 9 and 10 year-olds with effect 
from the beginning of 2004, which was also an election year, and the grant itself 
had been introduced in the year preceding the 1999 elections.  
 
The promise of raising the age limit to 18 was less important to the ANC in its 
2009 election campaign, however, than the fact that the ANC had previously 
expanded the CSG and could claim that this was the primary reason for the 
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claimed decline in income poverty in South Africa in the 2000s. In its manifesto, 
the ANC emphasized that it had “pushed back the frontiers of poverty” through 
the expansion of social grants. The Government paid grants for 8 million 
children, and more than 12 million people in total.28 In the face of criticisms of 
persistent poverty, ‘neo-liberal’ economic policies and rising inequality, the 
expansion of the CSG was politically useful evidence of the ANC’s commitment 
to and claimed success in reducing poverty. 
 
 
Affordability, handouts and the ‘welfare state’ 
 
As in the late 1990s (when the CSG was introduced) and early 2000s (when the 
age limit was raised to fourteen years), the crucial political struggle over raising 
the age limit between 2005 and 2009 occurred behind closed doors, within the 
ANC and Cabinet. The politics remain opaque, as is the case with much policy-
making in post-apartheid South Africa. The ‘state’ generally remains something 
of a ‘black box’. This is especially true of welfare reform, however, given the 
absence of strong, organized and observable vested interests comparable to 
either organized business or labour with respect to much economic, industrial 
and labour market policy (see, for example, Seekings & Nattrass, 2015: Chapter 
9). Whilst protests against public policy were widespread across South Africa, 
there was little evidence of protests against the parameters of social grants 
including the CSG age limit. Proudlock (2011), who was herself a leading figure 
in the advocacy work of the Children’s Institute and other NGOs in ACESS , 
claims that this advocacy work was of crucial importance, contributing to a 
‘culture of demand’ for both grants and and state accountability. But there was 
little evidence of this culture of demand among the public, or among the poor 
specifically. ACESS did not organize mass demonstrations, and I am unaware of 
public opinion polls that show that support was either intense or growing. Nor 
was support for the raised age-limit as hegemonic within the South African 
intelligentsia as, say, support for the rollout of anti-retroviral treatment for 
people with AIDS had been in the early 2000s. 
 
There was clear resistance within both ANC and state to raising the CSG age-
limit, as there was (and continues to be) clear resistance to the concept and 
project of ‘welfare-state’-building in South Africa. Consistently since 1994, 
successive presidents and ministers have denounced ‘handouts’ and 
‘dependency’, praised the ‘dignity of work’, workfare and job creation, and 
insisted that they were building a developmental not a welfare state (Seekings & 
Nattrass, 2015: Chapter 6). Conservative and developmental views about the 
role of the state sometimes overlapped with the Treasury’s fiscal caution: Scarce 
                                                                 




public resources should be invested in ‘developmental’ programmes, not 
‘handouts’ to the poor. 
 
The combination of weak external pressure (due to its enduring electoral 
strength) and the dominant ideology within the ANC explains the absence of 
major reforms of the social assistance system since 1994, including especially 
the rejection of the proposed basic income grant in 2002-04: Trade unions 
professed support, but never prioritized the issue; most ANC leaders dismissed 
the proposals as extreme handouts; other government ministers were skeptical 
about allocating massive resources to Social Development; the Treasury worried 
about the significant cost; and so on (see Matisonn & Seekings, 2003; Seekings 
& Matisonn, 2012).  
 
Table 1: Six episodes of potential reform, 1995-2009 
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limit 0.4% + + + + ↑↑ 
Note: + indicates positive effect and ++ a strongly positive effect on ↑ 
expenditure. 





With respect to the six episodes of proposed reform of child grants considered in 
this paper (and summarized in Table 1), these factors serve to explain the 
decision in the two cases in which massive increases of expenditure were 
rejected: the decision not to expand the existing SMG in 1995-96 (which would 
have cost 2 percent of GDP) and the decision to reject the recommendation of 
the Taylor Committee in removing the means-test and raising the age-limit (thus 
making the child grant universal, in line with GDP). They also explain the 
reluctance to raise the age-limit to 18 during the debate of 2005-08. 
 
Even in these three cases, however, conditions were not identical. This helps to 
explain the different outcomes. In 1995-96, the fiscal context was strongly 
adverse, the government was ill-disposed towards reform, and the newly-elected 
ANC was under no political pressure. By 2002-03, the fiscal context had 
improved greatly, with a marked drop in the budget deficit and government debt 
(see Figure 2), and there was growing pressure on and within the ANC to shift 
from the austerity of the late 1990s to a more boldly statist attack on poverty. 
Whereas the initial 1995-96 proposals entailed no significant change in public 
expenditure, in 2002-03 the government agreed to spend an additional 0.4 
percent of GDP in part to side-step pressure to spend much more in lines with 
the Taylor Committee recommendations. By 2008-09, the global recession was 
putting upward pressure on budget deficits, but the total public debt remained 
small, giving policy-makers some room for manoeuver, and governments 
globally adopted more interventionist fiscal as well as monetary policies to limit 
the recession. At the same time, politics within the ANC shifted, and the new 
ANC leadership felt evident insecurity in the face of the 2009 elections.  
 
The weakness of external pressure on the government and the dominant 
ideology within the ANC explain the government’s rejection of dramatic and 
expensive reforms, but they do not explain why the government chose modest 
expansions of the CSG in reforms in all five of the episodes shown in Table 1 
after the initial Lund Committee proposals, and why in the first episode the 
Government accepted the Lund Committee recommendation that a CSG be 
introduced. In 1996, the fiscal envelope appeared to be limited to about R1 
billion (in current prices at the time) or 0.2 percent of GDP. Even facing 
austerity, the Government agreed to introduce a CSG within this envelope. By 
2002/03, real expenditure was more than double this, as was expenditure as a 
share of GDP. Primarily as a result of the decision to raise the age limit to 
fourteen years, expenditure had doubled again by 2004/05 both in real terms and 
as a share of GDP. By 2007/08, real expenditure on the CSG was about ten 
times higher than the original SMG fiscal envelope, and cost more than 1 
percent of GDP. By 2012/14 real expenditure had risen by another 50 percent, to 
about 1.2 percent of GDP (which had itself grown also). A series of parametric 




public resources into child grants, even if the increase was much less than would 
have been required had the SMG been deracialised without other reform in the 
1990s or the Taylor Committee’s recommendations accepted. 
 
The CSG was expanded, in mostly modest increments, because its expansion 
had political champions and supporters within and outside the ANC and the 
reforms made political sense in the context of enduring poverty and rising 
inequality. In 1997-98, modest improvements in benefits were championed by 
ANC MPs supported outside Parliament by civil society groups. From 1999, the 
primary champion of reform was the wily Minister of Social Development, Zola 
Skweyiya, again urged on by civil society groups outside of Parliament. Had the 
CSG not been shown to be effective in reducing poverty rates, however, and had 
the ANC not been somewhat anxious about its performance in elections, it is 
unlikely that even Skweyiya would have been able to overcome the reticence of 
the Minister of Labour and the conservative distrust of ‘handouts’ elsewhere in 
the Cabinet.  
 
‘Affordability’ remained a recurring concern, not only to the Treasury but to the 
Cabinet and ANC generally. The fiscal crisis of the mid-1990s compelled the 
ANC and Government to adopt austere constraints on public expenditure, which 
– in combination with skepticism about grants – led to a decline in the late 
1990s in the real value of both the grants paid to individual beneficiaries and 
total public expenditure on social assistance. Other government departments 
were especially aware of the opportunity cost of allocating resources to social 
assistance. The improved health of public finances amidst renewed economic 
growth in the early 2000s meant that the political and economic cost of 
allocating increased resources to social assistance diminished. Allocating an 
additional 0.4 percent of GDP to the CSG for children to the age of fourteen was 
the least controversial alternative to the much greater expense of a universal 
CSG with an age-limit of eighteen years. When economic crisis hit in 2008, the 
government could legitimately finance an expanded programme through an 













































1998 April 100 100 0 7 (April) NA NA NA 
1999    0.03  NA NA NA 
2000    0.35  NA NA NA 
2001 July 110 91 0.97  2.4 4.5 0.2 
2002 Oct 140 103 1.9  4.6 7.8 0.4 
2003 April 160 114 2.6 9 (April) 7.7 12.7 0.6 
2004 April 170 121 4.3 11 (April) 11.4 18.4 0.8 
2005 April 180 124 5.7 14 (April) 14.1 22.1 0.9 
2006 April 190 127 7.0  17.6 26.1 1.0 
2007 April 200 125 7.9  19.6 27.0 1.1 
2008 April 210 118 8.2  22.4 27.6 1.0 
2009 April 240 125 8.8 15 (Jan) 27.3 31.8 1.2 
2010 April 250 124 9.4 16 (Jan) 30.9 34.7 1.2 






(Jan) 34.8 37.0 1.2 
2012 April 280 126 10.7 18 (Jan) 38.5 38.8 1.2 




125 11.3  39.6 40.0 1.2 




125 11.0  43.7 39.4 1.2 
2015 April 330 126   47.8 41.0 1.2 
2016 April 350       
* using headline CPI (Consumer Price Index) 
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